By Wei Pan, Chair Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Macau, Director of the Institute of Global and Public Affairs
Few grand strategies of major powers are rooted in conspiracy; they are, more often than not, overt and straightforward. In his second term, Trump is wasting no time, launching an ambitious and highly centralized "Hundred-Day Reform"(a failed Qing dynasty’s short-lived reform movement) to push through sweeping changes. There are three main pillars of this agenda: 1. A reactionary rollback of social progress, aggressively promoting conservative values to the point of glorifying ignorance and anti-intellectualism. 2. Money-making schemes, pursued through increased tariffs and a radical “slimming” of government, ostensibly for national interests, though personal enrichment cannot be ruled out. 3. “America First” to the extreme, characterized by withdrawing financial support from international alliances, focusing inward on domestic priorities, and even proposing to “buy out” Greenland and parts of Canada—signaling a return to North American isolationism as the new global vision.
Trump’s push to bring in money isn’t really about paying down the national debt—that’s a misreading of the American system. American presidents don’t clean up the mess left by their predecessors. In fact, racking up more national debt is where presidential “heroics” shine. Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio is far higher than America’s, but it raises little concern because the debt is mostly domestic. U.S. debt, similarly, is denominated in its own currency. The real issue lies elsewhere: Congress holds the government’s purse strings, and any administration has to contend with that constraint. Elon Musk assumes that America’s growing national debt signals its decline. He also believes that streamlining the government is like running one of his companies—failing to recognize that dismantling bureaucracies and laying off civil servants is constrained by the very checks and balances of U.S. democracy. In short, the political and economic resilience of the U.S. remains robust, and it will not be brought down by the “debt problem.”
Unlike previous U.S. administrations, Trump shows little interest in confronting China—ideologically or militarily—nor does he seem eager to build alliances for such purposes. This was made clear in his speech in Saudi Arabia, where he emphasized pragmatism over confrontation. His Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, hails from Miami and comes from a Cuban immigrant background, carrying with him a strong sense of Cold War–style “political correctness.” But ultimately, Rubio is merely Trump’s diplomatic instrument.
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What Trump didn’t expect was that China would turn out to be the hardest obstacle to “cashing in”—not the fat, docile sheep he imagined, ripe for shearing. This misjudgment stems from impressions formed during his first term and from the outdated intelligence outlook shaped during Biden’s presidency. First, he seems to believe he is still dealing with the China of seven years ago—one that he could easily outmaneuver through his “art of the deal” tactics, extreme pressure, and performative brinkmanship. Second, he assumes that China is now trapped in the middle-income dilemma, mired in irreversible demographic decline and population aging, further weakened by an economic slowdown allegedly caused by discrimination against both large and small private enterprises.
While China’s demographic decline and aging population are clear trends, they are not yet present-day realities—nor are they an unchangeable fate. In fact, China is entering a new phase of national momentum. First, the government’s support for private enterprises has rebounded to near-historic highs, signaling renewed confidence in market-driven growth. Second, after seven years of trade war, China has moved from a passive response to a strategic initiative. Higher U.S. tariffs now have minimal impact on Chinese exports and instead appear to be creating more problems for the U.S. itself. If Washington were to escalate toward full financial decoupling, it could risk destabilizing the global dominance of the U.S. dollar. Third, continued U.S. restrictions—particularly in high-tech sectors—have pushed China to invest heavily and consistently in cutting-edge innovation. Seven years on, those efforts are now bearing fruit, positioning China on par with the U.S. in several key frontier technologies.
Fourth, in response to technology blockades and growing provocations over the Taiwan issue, China has rapidly developed advanced military capabilities. In terms of both quantity and quality, its defense systems have reached a point where it can confidently deter U.S. pressure. Should a conflict erupt in the western Pacific, the U.S. would likely face an unwinnable confrontation. In short, China, which once hoped to quietly prosper through cooperation with the West, has been pushed into a new stage of unified national resolve—one of comprehensive advancement, determined to meet great-power challenges head-on.
Both China and the U.S. possess strong institutional resilience; neither is likely to decline or collapse quickly. Compromise is an inevitable outcome of long-term political rivalry. However, a compromise reached after intense struggle can only be achieved at a new and higher level. Thus, China has adopted the stance: “We do not want a fight, but we are not afraid of one. If it’s a fight, we will see it through to the end; if the U.S. wants to talk, the door is always open.”
The original Chinese version of this article was published in “Haiwai Kan Shijie (Global China)”, under the editorial leadership of Professor Quansheng Zhao. Original article link: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/FnHc-m7oM-wHZF58rt6pxg
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